Responding to the mental health consequences of the 2015–2016 terrorist attacks in Tunisia, Paris and Brussels: implementation and treatment experiences in the United Kingdom by Cyhlarova, Eva et al.
Responding to the mental health consequences of the 2015–2016 
terrorist attacks in Tunisia, Paris and Brussels: implementation and 
treatment experiences in the United Kingdom
LSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/104587/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Cyhlarova, Eva, Knapp, Martin ORCID: 0000-0003-1427-0215 and Mays, Nicholas 
(2019) Responding to the mental health consequences of the 2015–2016 terrorist
attacks in Tunisia, Paris and Brussels: implementation and treatment experiences
in the United Kingdom. Journal of Health Services Research and Policy. ISSN 
1355-8196 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1355819619878756
lseresearchonline@lse.ac.uk
https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 
Reuse
Items deposited in LSE Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights 
reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private 
study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights 
holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is 
indicated by the licence information on the LSE Research Online record for the item.
Responding	to	the	mental	health	consequences	of	the	2015–2016	terrorist	attacks	
in	Tunisia,	Paris	and	Brussels:	implementation	and	treatment	experiences	in	the	
United	Kingdom	
	
ABSTRACT	
Objectives:	To	explore	whether	the	Screen	and	Treat	Programme	to	support	United	Kingdom	
citizens	potentially	affected	by	terrorist	attacks	in	Tunisia	(2015),	Paris	(2015)	and	Brussels	(2016)	
was	effective	in	identifying	and	referring	people	to	mental	health	services,	to	examine	the	
programme’s	acceptability	to	users	and	to	understand	how	agencies	involved	worked	together.		
Methods:	Individuals	offered	screening	by	the	programme	(n=529)	were	invited	to	participate	in	
the	study	and	were	sent	a	questionnaire.	Follow-up	interviews	were	conducted	with	questionnaire	
respondents	who	consented	and	with	employees	of	agencies	involved	in	the	programme’s	
planning	and	delivery.	Seventy-seven	people	affected	by	the	attacks	completed	questionnaires,	35	
of	those	were	also	interviewed,	and	one	further	person	only	participated	in	an	interview.	Eleven	
people	from	agencies	organizing	and	delivering	the	programme	and	five	clinician-managers	were	
also	interviewed.		
Results:	Most	service	users	said	the	attacks	had	a	major	impact	on	their	lives.	Many	reported	
anxiety,	depression,	difficulty	going	out	or	travelling,	sleep	problems,	panic	attacks,	flashbacks	and	
hyper-vigilance.	A	third	had	reduced	their	working	hours	and	a	similar	proportion	had	taken	sick	
leave.	Two-thirds	sought	help	from	their	GP	before	being	contacted	by	the	programme,	but	almost	
all	thought	their	GP	had	not	been	helpful	in	dealing	with	post-traumatic	stress	disorder	(PTSD)	or	
referring	to	appropriate	care.	Several	people	were	prescribed	psychotropic	medication;	only	a	few	
were	referred	to	mental	health	professionals.	Many	participants	used	help	offered	by	
organisations	external	to	National	Health	Service	(NHS),	with	mixed	experiences.		
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Waiting	times	for	treatment	varied	from	no	delay	to	a	few	months.	Most	interviewees	thought	the	
Programme	should	have	started	sooner	and	provided	more	information	about	sources	of	support.	
Most	users	found	treatment	received	via	the	programme	helpful.		
Professionals	involved	in	organizing	and	delivering	the	programme	thought	that	bureaucratic	
delays	in	setting	it	up	were	key	limitations	on	effectiveness.	Clinician	interviewees	thought	an	
outreach	approach	was	needed	to	identify	at-risk	individuals.		
Conclusions:	Users	who	took	part	in	the	programme	were	satisfied	with	their	treatment,	although	
many	thought	it	should	have	been	offered	sooner.	Funding	and	data	sharing	between	agencies	
were	the	main	barriers	to	timely	contact	with	affected	individuals.	Self-referral,	GP	identification	
of	PTSD	and	GP	referral	to	appropriate	care	were	regarded	as	ineffective,	suggesting	that	people	
affected	by	similar	future	incidents	should	be	supported	better	and	assisted	more	promptly	to	
access	treatment.		
Background		
Terrorist	attacks	are	frequent	global	phenomena	with	wide-reaching	health	and	other	
consequences.	Post-traumatic	stress	disorder	(PTSD)	and	other	mental	health	problems	are	
common	concerns	for	those	affected,[1,	2]	but	often	missed	by	healthcare	professionals[3].	Self-
referral	and	use	of	routine	medical	care	appear	to	be	low[4],	leading	to	unmet	mental	health	
needs.		
	
There	is	limited	experience	in	establishing	effective	mental	health	service	responses	for	individuals	
affected	by	terrorist	attacks.	Although	some	people	recover	on	their	own,	many	need	support	to	
access	timely,	effective	treatment.[5]	Several	guidelines	describe	evidence-based	approaches	to	
providing	mental	health	support	and	treatment	for	people	affected	by	terrorist	attacks,[6–8]	but	
many	have	not	been	implemented	in	practice.[9,	10]	
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The	Screen	and	Treat	Programme	was	established	by	the	then	Department	of	Health	(DH)	in	
England	in	March	2016	to	support	United	Kingdom	(UK)	citizens	affected	by	terrorist	attacks	in	
Tunisia	(March	and	June	2015),	Paris	(November	2015)	and	Brussels	(March	2016).	Questionnaires	
screening	for	PTSD	(Trauma	Screening	Questionnaire;	TSQ)[11],	anxiety	and	depression	(Patient	
Health	Questionnaire–4;	PHQ-4)[12],	and	alcohol	use	(Alcohol	Use	Disorders	Identification	Test	
(AUDIT-C)[13]	were	sent	to	approximately	500	people	(injured,	bereaved	or	witnesses)	by	the	
Metropolitan	Police	and	returned	to	Public	Health	England	(PHE).	People	who	screened	positive	
were	assessed	by	the	Psychological	Response	to	Traumatic	Events	(PRTE)	team	at	South	London	
and	Maudsley	NHS	Foundation	Trust.	People	in	need	of	treatment	were	referred	to	local	mental	
health	services,	such	as	Improving	Access	to	Psychological	Therapies	(IAPT),	and	followed	up	by	
PRTE	until	end	of	their	care.		
Outcomes	of	the	screening	part	of	the	programme	suggest	that	it	was	generally	successful	in	
facilitating	access	to	services.[14]	Of	the	195	people	who	completed	screening,	179	(91.8%)	
screened	positive	on	one	or	more	indicators	measuring	PTSD,	anxiety,	depression,	increased	
smoking,	or	problematic	alcohol	consumption.	After	clinical	assessment,	78	adults	were	referred	
for	treatment.[14]	
Aims	of	the	evaluation	
The	aims	of	this	evaluation	were	to	explore	whether	the	Screen	and	Treat	Programme	was	
effective	in	identifying	and	referring	people	to	appropriate	services,	to	test	the	programme’s	
acceptability	to	users,	and	to	understand	how	agencies	involved	worked	together.		
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Methods	
Procedure		
Between	September	and	November	2016,	529	adults	affected	by	the	incidents	were	invited	to	
participate	in	the	evaluation.	Most	(476)	had	been	in	Tunisia,	41	in	Paris	and	12	in	Brussels.		
Potential	user	participants	were	sent	a	letter,	via	the	DH,	with	information	sheet,	consent	form,	
questionnaire	and	stamped	pre-addressed	envelope.	Responders	who	consented	to	being	
interviewed	were	contacted	by	a	researcher.	Interviews	were	conducted	by	telephone	(n=33)	or	
face-to-face	(n=3).	
A	total	of	78	responded	–	42	completed	the	questionnaire,	35	completed	the	questionnaire	and	
interview	and	one	completed	the	interview	only.	The	response	rate	was	15	per	cent.	Ninety-one	
per	cent	of	respondents	had	been	in	Tunisia,	four	per	cent	in	Paris	and	three	per	cent	in	Brussels	
(the	remainder	did	not	indicate	where	they	had	been).	Sixty-three	per	cent	of	user	respondents	
had	taken	part	in	the	programme,	27	per	cent	did	not.	The	remainder	did	not	indicate	whether	
they	had	taken	part.	
To	protect	user	participant	anonymity,	the	results	below	do	not	report	respondents’	incident	
location,	as	very	few	UK	citizens	were	affected	by	the	Paris	and	Brussels	incidents,	and	even	fewer	
took	part	in	the	evaluation.	
Representatives	of	agencies	involved	in	setting	up	and	delivering	the	programme	were	contacted	
by	email	and	invited	to	participate	in	telephone	interviews	conducted	between	October	2016	and	
March	2017	by	a	researcher.	Eleven	employees	of	agencies	involved	in	planning	and	delivering	the	
programme	(DH,	PHE,	PRTE,	NHS	England,	Metropolitan	Police)	were	interviewed.	Twelve	
clinicians	from	service	providers	who	had	received	multiple	referrals	via	the	programme	were	
invited	to	participate;	of	those,	five	clinician-managers	were	interviewed.		
5	
	
All	participants	provided	written	consent.	Detailed	electronic	notes	were	taken	during	interviews.			
Questionnaire		
The	self-completion	questionnaire	was	based	in	part	on	a	modified	Client	Service	Receipt	
Inventory	(CSRI)[15]	with	additional	questions	about	impact	of	the	event	on	work,	studies,	family	
responsibilities	and	other	activities.	
User	and	professional	interviews		
Interview	topic	guides	were	informed	by	National	Institute	for	Health	and	Care	Excellence	(NICE)	
Guidance	on	treatment	of	PTSD[16];	previous	studies[4,	17–19];	and	consultation	with	PTSD	
experts	and	an	expert-by-experience.			
Service	users	were	asked	about	their	experiences	of	the	programme,	including	screening,	
assessment	and	referral;	information	provided	to	them;	symptoms;	health	status;	time	delays	and	
their	decision	(or	not)	to	engage	with	the	programme.	They	were	also	asked	the	timing	of	the	
programme	and	any	delays	they	experienced;	about	the	treatment	options	they	were	offered	and	
if	they	were	satisfied	with	them;	and	about	their	overall	satisfaction	with	the	programme,	what	
worked	well	for	them	and	what	could	be	improved.	
Interviews	with	professionals	organizing	and	delivering	the	programme	asked	about	the	process	of	
providing	responses,	including	information	sharing	between	agencies,	how	users	were	moved	
through	the	programme	and	impact	of	the	programme	on	local	services	due	to	the	additional	
individuals	affected	by	terrorism.	
Analysis		
Based	on	issues	identified	in	the	literature[20],	an	initial	analysis	framework	was	created,	tested	
on	six	interviews	and	revised.	Data	were	analysed	using	the	revised	framework.	Any	new	topics	
were	noted	during	revision	and	subsequent	analysis	phases.		
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Ethical	review	
The	Health	Research	Authority	classified	this	project	as	a	service	evaluation	not	requiring	NHS	
Research	Ethics	Committee	review	or	NHS	R&D	approvals.	The	study	underwent	ethics	review	in	
keeping	with	the	London	School	of	Economic	and	Political	Science’s	Research	Ethics	Policy	and	
Procedures.	
Results	
Characteristics	of	users		
Table	1	gives	numbers	of	users	who	completed	evaluation	questionnaires	and	interviews	and	their	
engagement	with	the	programme.	Table	2	shows	users	affected	by	each	incident.		
Table	1.	Number	of	participants	in	each	evaluation	element	(as	of	March	2017)	
	 Participation	in	Screen	and	Treat	Programme	
(N)	
Total		
Evaluation	element	 Took	part		 Did	not	take	
part		
Did	not	
indicate	
	
Interview	and	questionnaire	 28	 7	 -	 35	
Questionnaire	only	 21	 13	 8	 42	
Interview	only	 -	 1	 -	 1	
Total	 49	 21	 8	 78	
	
Table	2.	Numbers	of	participants	affected	by	each	incident	
	 Incidents	 Did	not	
indicate		 Tunisia	 Paris	 Brussels	
Questionnaire	responders	 70	 3	 2	 2	
Interview	responders	 33	 1	 2	 	
	
Impact	of	the	attacks	
The	following	reports	users’	responses	to	questionnaire	and	interviews.	The	number	of	
respondents	varies	as	most	participants	only	responded	to	some	questions.		
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Onset	of	mental	health	problems		
Two-thirds	of	questionnaire	respondents	(46	of	67)	reported	that	daily	activities,	such	as	
housework	and	family	responsibilities,	had	been	adversely	affected.	Most	interviewees	(31	of	36)	
reported	that,	since	the	incident,	they	had	been	unable	to	get	on	with	their	lives	as	before.	
However,	five	people	said	that	the	event	had	relatively	limited	impact:		
I	learned	to	live	with	it,	tried	to	get	on	with	my	life	as	soon	as	possible,	shut	the	door	on	it.	It	will	never	
go	away.	The	news	brings	it	back.	We	lost	two	friends,	but	we	still	got	to	live,	you	can't	let	things	like	this	
dictate	you.	
Of	the	12	interviewees	who	answered	a	question	about	timing	of	their	symptoms,	seven	realized	
immediately	after	the	incident	that	they	were	experiencing	mental-health	problems,	while	four	
reported	a	delay	in	symptom	onset:	
[Three	months	later]	in	a	restaurant	I	had	an	extreme	startle	response	(to	party	poppers).		I	was	hiding	
under	the	table.	It	took	me	days	to	calm	down.	Then	the	episodes	increased.	
Anxiety,	panic	attacks	and	PTSD	symptoms	(re-experiencing	the	incident,	avoidance,	hyper-
vigilance)	were	the	most	frequently-reported	effects.	Several	questionnaire	respondents	were	
afraid	to	go	out	or	were	constantly	on	high	alert,	and	six	reported	difficulty	travelling	or	going	on	
holiday.	A	third	of	the	interviewees	experienced	acute	anxiety	in	public	places,	and	so	avoided	
going	out.	Several	found	it	difficult	to	cope	with	loud	noises,	especially	fireworks.		
Nine	respondents	reported	sleep	problems,	nightmares	and	flashbacks.	Many	reported	low	mood,	
depression,	lack	of	motivation,	difficulty	concentrating	and	social	isolation:	
I	can't	be	bothered,	have	no	inclination	to	do	anything	or	go	anywhere.	
A	few	people	developed	preoccupations	and	spent	a	lot	of	time	thinking	about	how	close	they	had	
come	to	being	killed;	some	had	friends	or	relatives	who	had	been	killed	in	the	attack:	
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I	 lost	 three	 family	members	 in	 the	Tunisia	beach	attack.	 I	 find	 it	 very	difficult	 to	accept	 the	way	 they	
died.	I	live	day	to	day	and	I	find	life	very	angry,	I	don't	bother	with	people,	only	family.	I	find	it	hard	to	
accept	our	loss.	
Several	respondents	had	experienced	relationship	difficulties	since	the	attack:		
I	argue	with	[my]	husband	and	distance	myself	from	family	members	for	fear	of	[them]	dying.	
Physical	health	
Physical	injuries	sustained	in	the	attacks	had	left	some	disabled:	
Initially,	 I	was	 discharged	 from	hospital,	 unable	 to	 do	 housework.	 I	 can’t	 leave	 the	 house	 unless	 in	 a	
wheelchair.	
Four	interviewees	(none	of	whom	were	injured)	reported	significant	deterioration	in	their	physical	
health	as	a	result	of	the	attack	(e.g.	multiple	sclerosis	deteriorating)	and	one	was	disabled	as	a	
result	of	the	attack.		
Impact	on	work,	studies	and	finance	
Over	a	third	of	questionnaire	respondents	(22	of	58)	had	reduced	their	working	or	studying	hours,		
24	of	66	had	taken	sick	leave	and	7	of	61	had	become	unemployed	or	had	ended/interrupted	their	
studies.	Time	taken	off	work	varied	from	a	few	days	to	several	months.		
Before	the	incidents,	28	of	36	interviewed	had	been	in	regular	work,	six	retired	and	two	not	
working.	Following	the	attacks,	13	people	took	time	off	work,	ranging	between	two	weeks	and	10	
months.	A	few	did	not	take	time	off	work,	finding	it	harder	being	at	home:		
In	the	end	I	had	four	months	off	work.	I	was	not	able	to	function,	then	I	had	a	phased	return	to	work.	It	
took	all	year.		
Four	people	had	financial	concerns,	in	addition	to	the	trauma	they	experienced:		
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Loss	of	income,	lost	financial	security	and	[loss	of	a]	loving	husband.	I	was	unable	to	return	to	my	role	at	
work.	I’m	just	returning	on	a	long-term	phased	plan	with	different	responsibilities.	
Use	of	support	services		
By	the	time	of	receiving	the	screening	questionnaire,	46	of	74	users	had	already	seen	an	NHS	
psychologist	or	counsellor,	and	half	(32	of	62)	had	seen	a	private	therapist.	Fewer	(12	of	66)	had	
seen	a	nurse,	been	to	an	A&E	department	(8	of	69)	or	seen	an	NHS	psychiatrist	(6	of	61).		
Interviewees	varied	considerably	in	their	desire	for	help	and	support:		
It	 wasn't	 until	 I	 got	 the	 referral	 from	 government	 offering	 help…Some	 people	 don't	 always	 ask	 for	
help...it	would	be	good	 to	have	 some	 information	available.	 I	was	worried	 that	 I	would	be	 sectioned,	
how	severe	it	was...People	don't	realize	that	it	is	a	normal	reaction,	you	don't	need	a	straitjacket.	
Experiences	with	GPs	
Nearly	two-thirds	of	questionnaire	respondents	(47	of	74)	had	seen	their	GP	as	a	result	of	the	
attack.	Of	the	36	users	interviewed,	25	sought	help	from	their	GP	before	the	programme's	launch,	
but	only	nine	thought	their	GP	had	been	helpful	or	sympathetic.	GPs	appeared	more	willing	to	
deal	with	physical	symptoms	(e.g.	minor	injury,	heart	problems,	asthma)	than	mental-health	
problems:		
	[My	GP]	was	a	bit	shocked,	she	didn't	say	a	lot	and	offered	tablets…She	didn't	know	what	to	tell	me.	
Thirteen	people	were	prescribed	sleep	and/or	antidepressant	medication.	Only	two	people	said	
the	medication	helped;	most	did	not	take	it.	
GP	referrals	to	mental	health	support	
Of	the	25	interviewees	who	sought	help	from	their	GP,	eight	people	were	referred	to	a	mental-
health	professional	(e.g.	mental	health	nurse,	counselling	or	generic	cognitive	behavioural	
therapy),	but	seven	people	found	the	treatment	did	not	help:		
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I	went	to	the	GP,	got	sleeping	pills	and	was	sent	to	a	nurse.	She	was	not	able	to	deal	with	it.	
Interviewees	from	agencies	organizing	the	programme	were	surprised	that	GPs	did	not	recognize	
PTSD:	
	My	idea	of	a	GP	 is	naïve.	 I	would	expect	referral	 [to	mental	health	services]	automatically	when	they	
hear	the	word	'terrorist'.	
Hospital	admissions	and	outpatient	attendances		
Six	of	the	77	questionnaire	respondents	were	admitted	to	hospital	with	physical	injuries	or	
medical	problems	as	a	result	of	the	incident.	Reasons	for	admission	included	gunshot	wounds	and	
angina.	Total	time	spent	as	a	hospital	inpatient	ranged	between	three	and	108	days.		
Fifteen	questionnaire	respondents	said	they	had	been	referred	to	a	hospital	as	an	outpatient.	
Number	of	outpatient	appointments	ranged	between	1	and	50.		
Non-NHS	support	
About	a	third	of	questionnaire	respondents	received	support	from	non-NHS	organisations,	with	
mixed	experiences,	including	counselling	offered	by	the	travel	agent;	support	or	therapies	offered	
by	charities	such	as	Victim	Support,	Assist	Trauma	Care	and	Samaritans;	unregistered	therapists	
and	professional	help	arranged	by	employers.	Most	of	the	14	user	interviewees	who	used	
counselling	provided	by	the	travel	agent	did	not	find	it	helpful.	Six	interviewees	praised	the	
Foundation	for	Peace/Survivors'	Assistance	Network	for	supporting	them	to	get	appropriate	help:		
It	was	well	over	a	year	before	 I	got	some	help.	The	most	helpful	were	the	Foundation	 for	Peace	who	
wrote	a	letter	to	the	GP	and	got	some	further	help.		
Several	people	said	the	Facebook	group	set	up	by	one	survivor	was	very	helpful.	Many	participants	
said	that	lack	of	mental	health	support	immediately	after	the	incident	meant	they	looked	for	any	
help	available.	
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Experiences	of	Screen	and	Treat	Programme	
Timing	
Of	the	36	user	interviewees,	28	accessed	the	programme,	and	26	of	those	expressed	views	about	
its	timing.	Twenty-one	thought	the	programme	started	too	late	and	that	their	health	deteriorated	
before	they	received	treatment.	Many	felt	that	access	to	support	earlier	would	have	allowed	them	
to	improve	earlier:		
[By	the	time	the	programme	was	available]	 it	was	too	 late,	 I	had	already	decided	I	couldn't	cope	with	
that	job.	I	couldn't	go	back	to	work	at	the	end	of	October.	This	[the	programme]	started	in	April.	Shame	
it	was	too	late.		
Screening	and	assessment		
Users	consistently	praised	the	PRTE	team	for	regular	contact,	care	coordination	with	local	services	
and	telephone	support	while	awaiting	treatment:	
[The	psychologist]	was	 very	 supportive.	 [She]	 rang	back	on	 a	monthly	 basis,	 to	 check	how	 things	 are	
progressing.	 She	 also	 spoke	 to	 the	 lady	 who	 is	 doing	 EMDR	 [eye	 movement	 desensitization	 and	
reprocessing].	
All	professional	interviewees	thought	the	outreach	worked	well	and	that,	without	it,	people	would	
have	missed	the	opportunity	to	receive	appropriate	care:			
[People	affected	by	 these	 traumatic	experiences]	do	not	 think	of	 themselves	as	having	mental	health	
problems	and	that	makes	them	reluctant	to	come	forward.		
Some	professionals	questioned	the	value	of	the	screening	process,	as	almost	all	screening	
results	were	positive.[9]	However,	they	thought	it	would	have	been	difficult	to	coordinate	
the	programme	without	the	central	PRTE	team.	Clinicians	described	the	PRTE’s	clinical	
assessments	as	very	useful.		
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Waiting	times		
Most	user	questionnaire	respondents	(61	of	77)	had	been	seen	within	18	weeks1	of	referral,	while	
16	waited	longer	than	18	weeks	for	their	first	appointment.	Three	interviewees	said	that	PRTE	had	
needed	to	put	pressure	on	local	services	as	they	were	not	getting	treatment	even	after	several	
months'	wait.	During	that	time,	one	user	had	felt	“isolated	and	not	cared	about".	Another	
described	difficulties	caused	by	waiting	for	treatment:	
I	spent	four	months	waiting	for	an	appointment.	That	was	the	hardest,	it	did	a	lot	of	mental	harm.	
Service-provider	interviewees	reported	average	waiting	times	ranging	between	two	and	25	weeks.	
Some	services	were	over-subscribed,	resulting	in	long	waiting	lists.	Although	the	instruction	from	
NHS	England	was	not	to	prioritize	people	affected	by	the	attacks	ahead	of	other	patients,	some	
IAPT	services	gave	them	higher	priority.	Conversely,	other	services	did	not	start	treatment	within	
the	18-week	waiting	target.	
Treatment		
Service	provider	interviewees	said	that	PRTE	was	crucial	for	the	effective	running	of	the	
programme’s	treatment	stage.	The	PRTE	team	liaised	with	each	local	therapist,	providing	a	
handover	and	assessment	compatible	with	IAPT	requirements.	The	team	offered	support,	training	
and	supervision	to	therapists,	which	was	well	received.	Therapists	thought	that	PRTE	made	sure	
that	users	stayed	engaged	with	services	and	provided	them	with	useful	information	and	coping	
strategies:	
The	ongoing	telephone	support	from	the	[PRTE]	psychologist	was	incredibly	helpful	and	it	gave	[the	user]	a	
good	understanding	of	coping	strategies,	which	helped	our	work.	
	
1	The	stated	target	is	that	75%	of	new	referrals	to	the	IAPT	programme	should	begin	treatment	within	six	weeks	of	referral,	and	
95%	within	18	weeks	(The	Mandate:	A	mandate	from	the	Government	to	NHS	England:	April	2015	to	March	2016,	p	16-17,	
available	at:	https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/38622	
1/NHS_England_Mandate.pdf)	
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Self-reported	treatment	outcomes	
Just	under	a	quarter	of	users	who	completed	the	questionnaire	thought	the	treatment	they	
received	had	helped	them	stay	in	work/study	or	return	to	work/study	earlier	than	would	
otherwise	have	been	the	case.	This	was	slightly	higher	for	those	who	had	taken	part	in	the	
programme;	nearly	a	third	reported	a	positive	impact	of	treatment	on	their	work/study.		
Overall,	the	28	interviewees	who	took	part	in	the	programme	were	satisfied	with	the	support	
received.	Eighteen	users	were	referred	for	treatment	but	ten	did	not	progress	beyond	screening.	
Of	those	referred,	13	were	referred	for	trauma-focussed	cognitive	behavioural	therapy	(CBT)	and	
two	for	eye	movement	desensitization	and	reprocessing	(EMDR);	three	were	waiting	for	treatment	
to	start	when	interviewed.	By	the	time	of	interview,	four	people	out	of	18	had	completed	
treatment,	ten	were	still	in	treatment	and	one	had	withdrawn.	Of	those	ten	who	did	not	progress	
beyond	screening,	five	were	already	in	treatment	elsewhere,	three	did	not	need	referral,	and	two	
declined	referral.	
At	the	time	of	interview,	four	people	had	completed	treatment	and	were	managing	well.	Each	of	
the	18	interviewees	who	took	up	treatment	via	the	programme	reported	getting	worse	before	
treatment	started.	Subsequently,	as	a	result	of	the	programme,	11	felt	they	were	getting	better,	
one	felt	the	same	as	before,	two	were	not	sure	if	it	was	helping,	one	did	not	find	the	treatment	
helpful	and	withdrew	after	four	sessions;	three	were	still	waiting	for	treatment	to	start.	Eight	of	
the	10	interviewees	still	in	treatment	when	interviewed	were	finding	it	helpful:		
I	am	almost	recovered,	almost	as	normal	as	before.	That	would	have	not	happened	without	Screen	and	
Treat.	
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Experiences	of	planning	and	administering	the	programme			
Funding	
The	professional	interviewees	said	it	was	difficult	to	plan	and	set	up	the	programme,	mainly	due	to	
a	Governmental	commitment	to	deliver	the	programme	before	funding	had	been	identified.	
Another	challenge	was	estimating	the	numbers	of	people	who	might	be	eligible	and	would	choose	
to	access	the	programme,	making	it	difficult	to	contract	a	service:		
It	was	difficult	to	know	who	to	include	as	other	attacks	happened	during	the	planning	stage	[Paris]".		
Set-up	phase	and	timing	
Professionals	planning	and	setting	up	the	programme	were	not	surprised	by	the	cumbersome	set-
up,	which	led	to	delays:		
We	were	slow	off	the	mark	in	terms	of	contacting	people...People	said	they	could	have	done	with	that	
six	months	earlier…It	was	a	year	after	Tunisia.	
Several	said	that	people	would	have	received	a	better	service	if	it	had	been	embedded	in	the	NHS	
rather	than	managed	from	central	government.	All	professional	interviewees	thought	the	delay	in	
setting	up	the	programme	had	considerably	limited	its	effectiveness,	and	clinicians	were	
concerned	about	the	consequences	of	lack	of	timely	and	appropriate	treatment.	One	professional	
said	"they	had	a	year	to	get	worse	and	develop	bad	ways	of	coping".	
Data	sharing	
Respondents	said	a	lack	of	data-sharing	agreements	between	agencies	contributed	to	delays	in	
contacting	affected	individuals.	Only	those	who	had	voluntarily	identified	themselves	to	the	police	
upon	returning	to	the	UK	could	be	contacted,	and	only	via	the	police,	who	carried	out	all	
communications	on	behalf	of	other	agencies,	including	the	DH	or	PHE.	It	was	impossible	for	other	
agencies	to	contact	people	directly:		
15	
	
There	was	the	unresolved	 issue	of	how	we	get	the	 initial	 list	of	people,	how	we	identify	those	at	risk.	
Having	a	 list	of	everyone	exposed	would	have	 really	helped	and	 follow-up	could	have	been	managed	
better.	
Some	people	who	might	have	needed	support	would	have	been	missed.	Two	people	affected	by	
the	Tunisia	event	confirmed	that	some	of	their	fellow	passengers	bypassed	the	police	at	airports	
because	they	"just	wanted	to	get	home".	
Suggestions	for	improving	future	responses	
Several	professionals	felt	the	service	should	be	built	into	the	NHS	and	that	local	services	should	be	
used	(including	GPs)	to	screen	people	for	PTSD.	Another	suggestion	was	for	quality-assured	non-
NHS	organisations	to	be	used.		
Professionals	recommended	reaching	out	to	people	through	several	channels,	including	online.	
They	also	suggested	that	group	interventions	(e.g.	if	large	numbers	of	people	were	affected	in	one	
locality)	could	be	offered	alongside	more	intensive	one-to-one	interventions.	
One	clinician-manager	suggested	developing	a	network	of	trauma	centres	around	the	UK	in	
preparation	for	coordinating	responses	ahead	of	similar	future	incidents.	Another	clinician-
manager	suggested	that	it	would	have	been	useful	to	be	able	to	refer	‘difficult	cases’	to	a	national	
specialist	centre,	such	as	PRTE.		
Timing		
User	interviewees	thought	that	timely	access	to	specialist	therapists	should	be	part	of	future	
responses:		
There	was	a	delay	in	getting	to	the	right	person.	I	could	have	been	somewhere	else	by	now.		
Several	users	indicated	that	earlier	information	about	available	support	would	have	encouraged	
them	to	pursue	it	and	possibly	improve	their	health	earlier:		
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Had	I	received	the	info	earlier,	it	would	have	prompted	me	to	do	something	earlier...I	didn't	realize	how	
affected	I	was	until	other	things	started	to	pile	up.		
Professional	interviewees’	recommendations	included	1–3	months	of	'watchful	waiting'	and	
checking	for	symptoms	for	those	identified	as	at	risk.	Several	professionals	felt	that	a	future	
programme	should	contact	potentially	affected	people	much	earlier,	give	them	a	point	of	contact,	
help	them	normalize	the	experience,	and	provide	information	about	“how	to	look	after	
themselves”.	
Information	and	communication	
Users	frequently	suggested	improving	information	about	help	and	support,	and	communication	
with	potentially	affected	individuals.	Users	did	not	mind	being	contacted,	but	of	the	28	people	
who	engaged	with	the	programme,	10	reported	lack	of	information	about	available	help:	
The	whole	process	you	felt	like	you	have	been	in	the	dark,	that	you	are	not	cared	about,	that	you	are	not	
important.	
Six	user	interviewees	said	that	the	Facebook	group	set	up	by	one	survivor	was	their	only	
information	source,	and	some	found	out	about	the	programme	by	accident.	Some	users	were	
aware	of	data	protection	issues	preventing	agencies	from	contacting	people	directly:		
When	I	asked	why	there	wasn’t	a	list	from	the	tour	operator,	[the	MP]	said	"we	cannot	do	that	because	
of	data	protection".	Surely	there	must	be	a	way	to	override	this,	it	was	a	lame	excuse.	
Discussion		
The	terrorist	attacks	in	Tunisia,	Paris	and	Brussels	had	profound	impacts	on	the	lives	of	people	
present	or	affected	indirectly.	Most	user	participants	reported	how	daily	activities,	working	lives	
and	general	functioning	were	affected,	often	considerably.	
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Some	people	did	not	seek	mental	health	support,	but	many	who	consulted	their	GP	found	that	
they	were	not	offered	effective	treatment.	Medication	was	the	first	line	of	treatment	offered	by	
many	GPs,	despite	limited	evidence	of	its	effectiveness	in	treatment	of	PTSD.[16]	Many	
participants	sought	help	from	non-NHS	sources,	with	mixed	results.		
	
Given	lack	of	appropriate	support,	users	regarded	the	Screen	and	Treat	Programme	as	very	
valuable.	They	found	the	central	screening	and	assessment	team	very	helpful,	especially	in	
providing	support	while	waiting	for	local	treatment.	Treatment	options	offered	to	adults	who	took	
part	in	the	programme	were	trauma-focused	CBT	and	EMDR,	recommended	by	NICE.[16]	Users	
were	satisfied	with	treatment,	although	most	thought	it	should	have	been	available	sooner.	A	
study	of	the	response	to	the	2015	Paris	attacks	supports	the	argument	that	people	affected	by	
terrorist	attacks	should	be	able	to	access	appropriate	healthcare	soon	after	an	incident:	those	
involved	in	the	Paris	attacks	who	received	specialist	trauma	support	in	the	first	48	hours	reported	
depression	and	anxiety	less	frequently	than	those	with	no	support.[5]	
	
Funding	and	data	sharing	between	agencies	were	seen	as	the	main	barriers	to	starting	the	
programme	promptly	and	to	timely	contact	with	affected	populations.	Data	sharing	appears	to	be	
a	recurrent	issue	in	major	incident	responses,	as	found	in	responses	to	the	Indian	Ocean	tsunami	
and	the	2005	London	bombings.[21,	17]	Our	findings	confirm	previous	evidence	that	people	do	
not	mind	being	contacted	about	potential	help,	indicating	that	official	systems	over-estimate	the	
public’s	desire	for	confidentiality.	Self-referral	and	GP	identification	of	PTSD	and	referral	to	
appropriate	care	were	largely	opportunistic,	suggesting	that	outreach	programmes	are	needed	to	
support	people	affected	by	terrorist	incidents	to	access	effective,	timely	treatment,	even	with	the	
constraints	placed	on	data	sharing	between	agencies.	
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The	main	limitation	of	this	study	is	absence	of	information	about	the	total	population	potentially	
affected	by	the	attacks.	Individuals	who	participated	in	the	programme	(or	evaluation)	may	not	be	
representative	of	the	population	affected.	
Conclusion	
This	evaluation	presents	an	opportunity	for	relevant	agencies	to	learn	from	the	programme.	Its	
findings	are	consistent	with	conclusions	from	evaluation	of	the	2005	London	Bombings	
programme,[17]	suggesting	that	future	response-planning	would	benefit	from	consideration	of	
recurring	issues,	such	as	data-sharing	constraints,	failure	of	standard	referral	pathways	and	
reluctance	to	self-refer.	
	
In	future,	evaluations	should	be	embedded	in	the	response	to	major	incidents,	with	the	aim	of	
reaching	the	entire	population	of	potentially	affected	individuals.	Better	understanding	of	people’s	
responses	to	this	type	of	trauma	over	time	in	wider	contexts	(e.g.	group	contexts)	would	help	
identify	other	factors	important	for	resilience	and	recovery	to	be	incorporated	in	future	responses.	
	
Agencies	planning	future	responses	in	the	UK	could:	
• Ensure	there	is	a	system	to	provide	immediate	psychological	help	in	response	to	terrorist	
attacks,	building	on	the	experience	of	previous	responses	and	on	NICE	guidance.			
• Define	and	agree	roles	and	responsibilities	of	all	government	and	non-government	agencies	
involved.	
• Agree	a	system	for	collection	and	management	of	contact	details	of	all	affected	people	as	soon	
as	possible	after	an	incident	and	including	how	those	details	would	be	collected	under	various	
incident	scenarios	(e.g.	in	the	UK	or	abroad,	large	numbers	affected	in	one	location	or	spread	
across	the	country).	
• Arrange	data-sharing	agreements	between	the	relevant	agencies,	within	the	constraints	of	
current	legislation	or	by	amending	legislation,	to	facilitate	rapid	direct	communication	by	the	
NHS	with	people	affected.		
• Prepare	a	plan	for	informing	and	communicating	with	people	affected	by	terrorist	incidents,	
including	developing	and	publicizing	an	accessible	website	such	as	NHS	Choices	with	
information	about	symptoms	of	trauma,	PTSD,	depression,	anxiety	and	other	potential	issues,	
self-care,	support	available	and	how	to	access	mental-health	services.	
19	
	
• Ensure	that	GPs	and	other	health	professionals	are	adequately	trained	to	identify	PTSD	and	
other	mental-health	problems	and	to	make	appropriate	referrals	to	evidence-based	
treatments.	
• Utilize	existing	networks	of	IAPT	services	and	services	provided	by	non-NHS	organisations	to	
provide	timely	evidence-based	advice,	support	and	treatment.	
• Develop	guidance	for	approaching	problems	likely	to	be	encountered	when	implementing	a	
mental-health	response	(e.g.	assessing	mental-health	needs,	coordinating	an	appropriate	
response,	ensuring	equality	of	access	to	care).	
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